What Went Wrong? A Study of Actual Industrial Cyber Security Incidents Zach Tudor Mark Fabro SRI International RISI Advisory Panel Member

SCADA Security is Making Headlines

Russian hackers vandalized BTC pipeline data servers				
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.				
Aex	Cess	s of rumour and a shortage	of fa	acts
gas from a	Electri	icity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies	•••••	ne er
attacks ca	By SIOBHA		7	gh
Baku-Nov	WASHING	FD	ns that	ion was
recovered	could be u	Foreign Policy"		
The paper	The spies of to navigate		a mission er grid or	ata
servers ur	other key i	The New Threat to Oil Supplies: Hackers	igence	ala
<u>음</u> 304억	official. "S	Offshore drilling rigs are increasingly computer-dependent and remote-controlled. That could make them vulnerable to attacks from hackers from around the globe.	igenee	
	The espior former De official sai	BY GREG GRANT AUGUST 25, 2009 Earlier this year, a sullen, 28-year-old contractor in California was charged in federal court with sabotaging the computerized controls on oil-rig sitting off the coast, allegedly out of spite for not being hired full time. Prosecutors say the contractor hacked into a shore-to-rig communications network that, among other functions, detected oil leaks. He caused thousands of dollars worth of damage, they	aid a rmer	
		charge, though, fortunately, no leaks. A research team from the SINTEF Group, an independent Norwegian think tank, recently warned oil companies worldwide that offshore oil rigs are making themselves particularly vulnerable to hacking as they shift to unmanned robot platforms where vital operations – everything from data transmission to drilling to sophisticated navigation systems that maintain the platform's position over the wellhead		-

Separating Fact from Fiction

How much of what is reported is real versus hype? Need a realistic assessment of the risks to our critical infrastructures:

- What is fact and what is urban myth?
- How urgent is the security risk?
- What vulnerabilities are exploited?
- What are the threat sources?
- How serious are the effects?

What is **RISI**?

- Database of incidents of a cyber security nature that directly affect industrial Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and process control systems
- Includes accidental cyber-related incidents, as well deliberate events such as external hacks, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, and virus/worm infiltrations
- Data is collected through research into publicly known incidents and from private reporting
- Includes expert analysis and commentary on lessons learned and recommended mitigation techniques



History

Industrial Security Incidents Database (ISID) developed through academic research project at the British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT).

1/1/2002

1/1/2001

1/1/2003

1/1/2004

ISID was discontinued in 2006. Byres Research acquired the rights to ISID from inventors Project initiated to develop the Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI) using ISID data plus incidents collected since 2006

1/1/2007

1/1/2008

Exida acquired Byres Research and created the Security Incidents Organization[™], a 501c(3) non-profit, to operate and maintain RISI

1/1/2009

ICSJWG 2010 Spring Conference

1/1/2006

1/1/2005

1/1/2010

The Security Incidents OrganizationTM

- The Security Incidents Organization is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit company that operates the Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI)
- Funding for operating The Security Incidents Organization is provided by private membership dues

6

Value

- Identify common factors contributing to incidents, such affected equipment, entry point, type of incident, impact, etc. to prevent future incidents
- Sharing of lessons learned through historical data
- Provide an industry benchmark for continuous improvement
- Provide statistics for business cases that security managers must write to get funding

Type of Data Collected

- Incident Title
- Date of Incident
- Reliability of Report

 1=Confirmed, 2=Likely But
 Unconfirmed, 3=Unlikely
 4=Hoax/Urban Legend
- Type of Incident (e.g. Accident, Outside Hack, Virus, etc.)

•Industry (e.g. Petroleum, Pulp, Automotive, etc.)

- •Entry Point
- •Perpetrator
- •Brief Description
- Impact on Company
- •References
- •And more...

Highlights from Annual Report

- Issued quarterly
- Most recent report issued 22 Mar 2010
- 161 incidents (confirmed or likely)
- Averaging about 10 new incidents per quarter
- Only confirmed or likely incidents are included in the report



Repository for Industrial Security Incidents (RISI)

Report on Cyber Security Incidents and Trends Affecting Industrial Control Systems

> Annual Summary 2009 (Includes events occurring through December 31, 2009)

 Prepared for:
 Client Name

 Prepared by:
 The Security Incidents Organization

 Revision:
 1.0

 Issued on:
 March 21, 2010

Time will tell



The number of Industrial cybersecurity incidents has remained stable but is expected to rise based on recent reporting rates.

Who is getting attacked?



ICSJWG 2010 Spring Conference

2010 The Security Incidents Organ

How has it changed?

Industry Type	2000-2004	2005-2009	% Change
Water/Waste Water	3	14	367%
Power and Utilities	10	13	30%
Transportation	10	10	0
Food & Beverage	5	3	-40%
Petroleum	19	3	-84%
Chemical	8	1	-88%

Incident Types



13

What incident types are on the rise?

Incident Type	2000-2004	2005-2009	% Change
Accidental Software Failure	2	8	300%
External - System Penetration	3	9	200%
Internal - Sabotage	2	6	200%
Control/SCADA System Failure	12	17	42%
Accidental Inappropriate Control	5	4	-20%
Accidental Incident	2	1	-50%
External - Sabotage	4	2	-50%
External - Virus/Trojan/Worm	41	7	-83%
Accidental Network Failure	6	1	-83%
External - Denial of Service (DoS)	3	0	-100%
Internal - Non-Authorized Access	0	3	N/A

Accidental Equipment Failure is proving to be on the rise in the past 5 years.

Example incidents

Risi

The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents www.securityincidents.org

Hackers Penetrate Water System Computers

Date:	October 2006
Company:	Harrisburg Water System
Location:	Harrisburg, PA, USA
Industry:	Water & Wastewater
Incident Type:	Intentional - External - Hacker
Impact:	Unknown



Description:

A foreign-based hacker used the internet to infiltrate the laptop (via internet) of an employee at the Harrisburg water system. The hacker used the employee's remote access as the entry point into the SCADA system and installed malware and spyware on a SCADA HMI computer.

Source: The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (www.securityincidents.org)

Accidents happen

- Accidental cyber incidents account for 44% of all incidents reported in RISI.
- Consequences can range from nuisance to catastrophe.



Example Accidental Incident **Risi** The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents

www.securityincidents.org

INCIDENT ID#: 112

TITLE: Ping Sweep Causes PCS System to Hang

DATE of EVENT: 9/1/1998

DESCRIPTION:

On a PCS network, a ping sweep was being performed to identify all hosts that were attached to the network, for inventory purposes, and it caused a system controlling the creation of integrated circuits in the fabrication plant to hang.

IMPACT:

The destruction of \$50K worth of wafers.

FOLLOW-UP WORK:

Unknown.

Example Incidents

Risi

The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents www.securityincidents.org

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Scrammed

Date:	Aug. 2006
Company:	Browns Ferry Nuclear
Location:	Athens, AL, USA
Industry:	Nuclear Power
Incident Type:	Accidental Equipment Failur
Impact:	Unit #3 shutdown



Description:

Operators manually scrammed Browns Ferry, Unit 3, following a loss of both the 3A and 3B reactor recirculationpumps. The root cause was the malfunction of the VFD controller due to excessive traffic on the plantEthernet based integrated computer system (ICS)network.

Source: The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (www.securityincidents.org)

Keep your friends close...

Internal attacks account for 12% of reported incidents



Example incidents

The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents www.securityincidents.org

Disgruntled Contractor Disables Pipeline Leak Detection System

Date:	March 2009
Company:	Pacific Energy Resources Ltd.
Location:	Long Beach, CA, USA
Industry:	Petroleum
Incident Type:	External Hacker
Impact:	Leak Detection System Disabled



Description:

Risi

A disgruntled employee, Mario Azar, accessed the system that monitors the detection of pipeline leaks for three oil derricks off the Southern California coast. He knowingly temporarily disabled the system.

The FBI announced that, on September 14, 2009, Mario Azar pleaded guilty to intentionally damaging a computer system used in interstate and foreign commerce and faced ten years in prison. His sentencing is scheduled for December 7 in the United States District Court of Los Angeles.

Source: The Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (www.securityincidents.org)

Reporting to RISI

You and your company's identity remains completely confidential. It will not be shared with any legal or government entities.

How to submit:

- Download a reporting form (editable PDF) from: <u>http://www.securityincidents.org/register.asp</u>
- Email to <u>submit@securityincidents.org</u> (PGP key available)
- Fax paper form to: 215-257-1657

You will get free membership for 3 months